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The Impacts of Interbank Connections: Evidence from Mergers and 
Acquisitions
Christina Zhang
California State University, Monterey Bay
The paper identifies the difference between connected and unconnected deals and examines the impact of 
the interbank connections among M&A deals. Deals with connected advisors are generally more complex 
and larger than the ones without. In addition, target valuation is significantly higher for deals with 
connected advisors than the ones without. However, the completion rate is generally indifferent between 
the two types of deals, but the completion time is typically shorter for the deals with connected advisors. 
Moreover, targets ’ announcement returns are significantly positive when connected advisors are hired. 
Overall, it appears that interbank connections benefit the target firms.
INTRODUCTION
The Merger and Acquisition (M&A) deals have grown dramatically both in terms of size and volume 
over the last two decades. Although it is not required by law to hire financial advisors for M&A 
transactions, investment banks advised on over 85% of these deals by transaction value (Golubov et al., 
2011). Investment banks specialize in reducing information asymmetry between the acquirers and targets. 
As financial advisors, they can use their expertise to gather information from both parties and process it 
efficiently. Because of this, an appropriate price that benefits both acquirer and target can be derived, and 
the deal can be completed in a timely fashion. Investment banks will receive their advisory fee upon the 
completion of the deal, which is one of their main revenue streams.
Between 1990 and 2015, there are over 10,000 M&A deals worldwide that hire at least one financial 
advisor. Financial advisors are typically hired to explore strategic opportunities that can maximize 
shareholder value or expand its businesses. To avoid conflict of interests, acquirers and targets often hire 
different financial advisors. However, in some extreme cases, one bank can assume both roles. For 
example, Goldman Sachs were hired by both NYSE and Archipelago as their financial advisor during 
their merger despite the potential conflict of interests. The incident raised a lot of questions. Majority of 
the people questioned the ability of Goldman Sachs to stay neutral and treat both parties equally. One of 
their main concerns is the quality of the deal may be compromised for deal completion. Because advisory 
fee is contingent on deal completion, bank may simply want to complete the deal regardless of the deal 
quality. When acquirer and target hire separate advisors, information will be verified by both parties, so 
the deal quality is checked twice. On the other hand, when a common advisor is used, the integrity of the 
verification process becomes questionable. It becomes relatively easy for the bank to hide potential 
problems that can break a deal when they are eager to complete such deal to earn their advisory fee. Thus, 
bad deals are more likely with occur, and both acquirer and target will experience a loss in wealth.
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Contrary to the common belief, Agrawal et al. suggest it is unnecessary to have such concern. They 
believe it is in the advisor’s best interests not to exploit its clients because potential damage to bank’s 
reputation and high litigation costs outweighs the advisory fee received in a single transaction. The fees 
each bank charges for its service are the quasi-rents of its reputation. The higher the reputation, the more 
likely it will be chosen for various business deals and the more money it can collect from those future 
businesses. Hence, a bank should not be motivated to ruin its reputation for one deal. Furthermore, they 
think a common advisor can indeed improve deal outcomes because a common advisor has an 
information advantage over an unshared financial advisor. A common advisor has better access to firm- 
level private information, so it can reduce information asymmetry more effectively, which is one of the 
main reasons for hiring financial advisors in M&A deals in the first place.
This paper extends their findings by examining the difference between M&A deals using unconnected 
financial advisors and the ones using connected financial advisors. We propose when the acquirer’s 
financial advisor(s) and the target’s financial advisor(s) have prior connections, the information flows 
more smoothly between the two parties than if the advisors are not connected. In our sample, the 
acquirers and targets still hire separate financial advisors, but the advisors they use can either be 
connected via prior business transactions or be complete strangers. Our criteria allow us to have a lot 
more observations than the study with common advisors, so our results can be more applicable in the real 
world. In addition, we can have a better understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of interbank 
connections by directly testing their impacts on the outcomes of M&A deals.
Much of the existing M&A research has been focused on studying the benefits and use of bank-firm 
relationships. For example, banks are more likely chosen as financial advisors if they have prior 
relationships with the firms, ceteris paribus. The bank is more likely to work as the financial advisor for 
the acquirer than for the target if it has relationship with both parties. However, we are unaware of any 
prior study that looks at interbank connections and how they play a role in M&A deals. This paper is the 
first to explicitly examine the impact of interbank connections on M&A deals. It hopes to fill the gap in 
the M&A literature regarding determinants of financial advisors. At the same time, it helps to shed lights 
on research regarding the advantages and disadvantages of banking relationships. Perhaps, the idea of 
Agrawal et al.’s paper is the closest to what we are looking here, but the focus of their paper is the use of 
common advisor, and it does not examine the interbank connections between the financial advisors. One 
may argue common advisor can be viewed as an extreme case of interbank connections since the use of 
one common advisor indicates complete interbank connections. If that’s the case, this paper will be a 
more general study of such connections. It hopes to address questions that cannot be answered if we only 
look at deals with common advisors.
We start by examining the determinants of using connected financial advisors in M&A deals. We 
then compare the deal outcomes following the advisor choice, such as the deal completion rate, 
completion speed, deal premium, and announcement returns of both the acquirers and targets. Among the 
4,667 deals we examine, 2,929 deals use connected advisors. The deals with connected advisors are 
generally larger and more complicated than the ones without. The average deal value for connected 
advisor is $1.7 billion while it is only $0.32 billion for the unconnected advisor deals. The deal 
completion rate and completion time is generally indifferent between the two types of M&A deals. Target 
valuation is significantly higher when the financial advisors are connected than if they are not. On the 
contrary, announcement returns are significantly lower for the acquirers if they use connected advisors 
than if unconnected advisors are hired.
Some may argue interbank connections can be correlated with advisor reputation since connection is 
measured as prior business interactions. Thus, larger and more reputable banks are more likely to have 
connections with each other than the smaller and less reputable ones. Indeed, our sample reveals the 
connected advisors are more likely to be involved in deals that are larger, with more financial advisors 
and more reputable advisors. In order to address this issue, we include advisor reputation variable in all 
the regression tests to control for the reputation effect. Results hold after controlling for advisor reputation 
in the multivariate regression. The interbank connections bring in additional benefits to the M&A deals. 
Interestingly, the connected advisors are less likely to be associated with deals involving public targets.
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One possible reason is the fact that public targets are often more transparent than their private 
counterparts, so there is little information asymmetry. Hence, it is easier to exchange and verify valuable 
firm-level information between the acquirers and targets. As a result of this, the value of interbank 
connection is significantly reduced.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the prior literature. 
Section 3 discusses the roles of M&A advisors and develops main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
sample and data. Section 5 presents the test results and discussion, and Section 6 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Investment banks value their M&A advisory business. M&A advisory fees are correlated with the 
deal size (Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997). In addition, majority of the advisory fees are contingent on deal 
completion, which creates a conflict of interest between advisors and their clients (McLaughlin, 1990). 
The financial advisors have a strong incentive to complete the deals in a timely manner, so they can 
receive the payments for their services. On the other hand, the firms want to make sure the deals they are 
pursuing are indeed valuable to them. These two interests don’t align perfectly. Banks are better off when 
a larger M&A deal is completed under their assistances, but it may not be the case for the firms. Studies 
find that contingent-fee structures often lead to poor outcomes. Acquirers have worse post-acquisition 
stock performance (Rau, 2000), which suggests advisors choose deal completion over deal quality. Banks 
are so motivated by the fees to complete the deal that they ignore problems associated with the deals. The 
acquirer’s announcement returns are also lower under the contingent-fee structure. Targets, on the other 
hand, appears to be unaffected or less affected by the conflict of interest than their counterparts (Allen et. 
al, 2004).
Relationship often aids in information production and processing. For example, firms often get better 
loan terms and prices from their relationship lenders (Peterson and Rajan, 1994). Banks are more likely to 
be selected as financial advisors if they have lending relationship with the clients because they have 
greater knowledge about the business and it is easier for them to process the information (Francis et. al, 
2006). This is very useful in the case of an M&A deal since the role of a financial advisor is to assist its 
clients in getting a more favorable deal price and terms than what they would have gotten on their own 
(Allen et. al, 2000). The more knowledgeable banks are about their clients, the more efficient they can be 
evaluating and certifying the deals. An M&A deal can be initiated by either party. Contrary to the 
common belief that acquirers are typically the ones proposing the deal, about 40% of M&A deals are in 
fact initiated by targets. Once the two parties are interested in participating in a merger or acquisition, it is 
the advisor’s job to help with information gathering and processing. The information asymmetry between 
the acquirers and the targets often makes it hard for the two parties to handle the deal by themselves. 
Without an independent third party to verify the deal, both parties worry about being taken advantage of. 
A lot of firm-level information is not readily available. During the due diligence period, each party is 
expected to present honest information about itself, so the other party can have a knowledgeable 
assessment of an appropriate offer price. When the financial advisors have prior connections because of 
the past deals they have in common, it makes it easier to exchange the relevant information for deal 
valuation purposes. It also makes them more trustworthy to each other than if they have no connections. 
The banks can spend less time on verifying the information they gather, so it will be quicker for them to 
figure out the overall quality of the deal and determine a correct offer price. This is especially useful 
when the deal is complex and its quality is hard to judge. On the other hand, when the financial advisors 
don’t have any prior connections, such process will be harder to complete because of the lack of trust 
between the two parties.
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
A bank can be hired as either a buy-side advisor or a sell-side advisor in an M&A deal. As a buy-side 
advisor, the bank needs to assist its client in deal valuation, so an appropriate offer price can be derived. 
The buy-side advisors generally gather the information from the target company via its advisors. They 
then value the target and assess the proposed acquisition based on the information. In addition, they need 
to propose various financing methods along with their advantages and disadvantages to their clients, so 
the clients can choose the one(s) that are feasible and most suitable for them, and the transaction can be 
executed. From time to time, they may participate in deal negotiations as well (Fleuriet, 2008).
As a sell-side advisor, in addition to preparing information to be delivered to the interested buyers, 
the bank may need to identify and contact potential buyers first. Once the buyer is identified, the advisor 
will meet with the buyer’s representatives to market the target firm. Essentially, the advisor needs to make 
the buyer see the potential synergy that can be resulted from a successful merger or acquisition. The buyer 
needs to know how valuable the target firm is to them. Once it sees the value of the target, the negotiation 
can begin. The sell-side advisor will most likely be involved in the negotiation process as well, so its 
clients can get a favorable offer, which allows it to be financially benefited from the transaction.
The availability and credibility of firm-level information is a key element in M&A deals. An M&A 
deal generally requires collaboration between a buyer and a seller, M&A negotiations also have an 
adversarial component as the two sides haggle over the purchase price and deal terms (Eccles and Crane, 
1998). Connected advisors can help alleviate such concerns. Information flows more smoothly between 
the buyer and seller when their advisors have prior connections because trust is already established 
between the two banks. With the existing trust, the needs for information verification is significantly 
reduced, which in turn reduces the time it requires to process the information. As a result, both parties can 
make informative decisions more efficiently than they would have without connected advisors. Moreover, 
connected advisors typically know more about each other, such as how they deal with various transactions 
and the assumptions they generally make. These understandings can potentially help with the new deal, 
which leads to our first hypothesis. When the financial advisors are connected, such connections facilitate 
information flow, so complex deals are more likely to succeed in a relatively shorter period of time.
However, like common advisors, connected advisors may also face conflicts of interest, although it 
may not be as significant since connected advisors are still separate entities. M&A advisor fee is generally 
contingent-based, so financial advisors are motivated to complete the deals in order to collect their 
payment. When the advisors have prior connections, or have strong relationship with each other, it is 
easier for them to overlook the bad information that can potentially break the deal. As a result, the deal 
quality may be sacrificed for the sake of deal completion. This leads to our second hypothesis. Deal 
quality is likely to be worse when the financial advisors are connected. However, some may argue banks 
care more about their reputation than what they can get from one single deal. If their clients find out the 
financial advisors being dishonest, it will hurt their reputation significantly, which in turn will affect their 
future businesses. It is unlikely for banks to take that risk. Hence, deal quality should only be worse for 
the connected but less reputable banks.
Last but not least, firms are more likely to hire connected financial advisors when they need to 
minimize information asymmetry. In other words, interbank connections become more valuable as the 
deal becomes more complicated and information becomes harder to gather and process. Therefore, unlike 
common advisors, who are typically used by simple and small deals, we should see a greater number of 
complex deals being associated with connected financial advisors, especially for deals involving private 
targets. Connected advisors have an information advantage over the unconnected ones. Such advantage is 
extremely useful when information about the buyer and/or the target is hard to obtain. With public targets, 
the information asymmetry is usually small because it is generally easy to get relevant information about 
a firm if it is public. Hence, financial advisors do not need to rely on their connections.
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SAMPLE AND DATA
We use the Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC) to identify all 
acquisitions made by U.S. public firms from January 1, 1990 to May 31, 2015. We require both acquirer 
and target use at least one financial advisors for the transaction. Following the literature, we exclude 
recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchase, privatizations, and transactions with 
unreported deal values. We also exclude leverage buyouts, spin-offs, and clean-up mergers (where the 
target is a partially-owned subsidiary of the acquirer). In addition, we require the acquirer to have 
majority ownership following the acquisition. Lastly, we delete two acquisitions of real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) and two consolidations of subsidiaries. Our final sample includes 4,667 deals, out of which 
1,850 deals have public targets.
Our variable of interest is Connection. To build this variable, we first assign a unique advisor id to 
each financial institution that appears at least once during our sample period. With the help of the unique 
id, we then look back 5 years to see if the advisors from two sides are ever involved in the same deal 
either on the same side or on the opposite sides. If there is at least one past interaction, we consider the 
advisors are connected. We do this for every pair of advisor combination in our sample to make sure no 
connection is missing. Unfortunately, like ordinary firms, financial institutions initiate M&A transactions 
as well. Indeed, there are a lot of mergers and acquisitions involving financial institutions as acquirers or 
targets. The M&A activities among financial institutions increase the difficulty of identification 
significantly. For example, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch after the 2008 Finance Crisis. 
Following the acquisition, Bank of America is assumed to inherit all connections that belong to Merrill 
Lynch, so now it will have two types of connections to be considered, one being the connection it builds 
on its own and the other being the connection Merrill Lynch builds overtime. Because of this, if Bank of 
America is hired as a Financial Advisor for one side, we must gather its connections based on both its 
advisor id as well as the advisor id of Merrill Lynch. When there are multiple financial advisors on the 
record, we follow the same method to identify interbank connections for each advisor. As long as one of 
the buy-side advisors is connected with at least one of the sell-side advisor(s) or vice versa, we classify 
the deal as a connected advisor deal. That leaves us with 2,929 deals with connected advisors. A small 
number of our deals use common advisors. For the purpose of our study, we classify those deals as 
connected advisor deals as well because common advisor is an extreme form of advisor connection. In 
general, connected advisors are more common than unconnected ones, and the number of connected 
advisor deals increases significantly overtime, which makes sense because it takes time to build 
connections.
To measure the deal quality, we use the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the stocks of 
acquirers around the announcement dates. The abnormal return is estimated as the difference between 
acquirer’s stock’s return and CRSP’s value-weighted market return index. The CAR for the firm is the 
summation of all abnormal returns around the estimation window. If the market responds to the 
announcement positively, it implies the M&A deal is of superior quality. If the market responds to the 
announcement negatively, the deal is of inferior quality. When the target firms are also publicly traded, 
we get their announcement CAR as well.
The more advisory businesses a bank is involved in, the better connected it will be. The amount of 
advisory businesses one can be involved in depends greatly on its reputation. Firms are more likely to hire 
Goldman Sachs than they are with Pacific Valley Bank. Advisor connection should be highly correlated 
with its reputation. Thus, some may argue the influence from interbank connections is purely a result of 
bank’s reputation. To alleviate this concern, we create another variable, which is Reputation, to be used as 
our main control variable. Following Rau (2000) and others, we use advisors’ M&A market share to 
measure their reputation. The advisor’s M&A market share is calculated as total dollar value of all deals 
for which it was an advisor in a given year divided by the total dollar value of all the deals in the same 
year, expressed as a percentage. The value of the transaction is adjusted for inflation for consistency. 
They are all in 2015 dollar, so it allows us to compare the value of the deal across multiple decades. We 
then rank the advisors by their percent market share for each year. The top five advisors are classified as
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top tier, receiving an advisor rank of 1. The next 15 advisors are considered as second tier, receiving an 
advisor rank of 2, and the remaining gets an advisor rank of 3. When there are multiple financial advisors 
on the deal, we use the highest rank of all as the deal’s advisor rank.
Table 1 Panel A reports the number of M&A deals by year. The number of deals varies each year, but 
it reaches its peak in the late 1990s. On average, the overall completion rate for the sample is 93%. There 
is a dramatic increase in deal value over the past 2 decades. The average deal value increases from $429 
million in 1990 to almost $2.5 billion in 2015. The aggregate deal value increases from roughly $30 
billion to about $1.3 trillion. This indicates M&A has become increasingly popular among large firms. 
The number of financial advisors used in the deal appears to be stable. Both acquirer and target typically 
hire at least one advisor to assist with the transaction.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Panel A.
year N Rate of 
Completion
Mean Deal
Value (in
$ millions)
Mean 
number of 
Financial 
Advisors 
per deal
Number of 
Completed 
Deals
Aggregate 
Deal Value 
(in
$ millions)
1990 72 0.88889 428.87 2.20833 64 30878.4
1991 77 0.90909 399.74 2.36364 70 30780.21
1992 100 0.95 367.94 2.27 95 36793.79
1993 165 0.93939 534.63 2.48485 155 88213.73
1994 200 0.9 485.49 2.315 180 97097.14
1995 250 0.928 774.69 2.248 232 193671.92
1996 303 0.92739 678.07 2.27393 281 205455.59
1997 408 0.93627 900.62 2.31127 382 367454.23
1998 376 0.93883 1473.78 2.28191 353 554142.23
1999 359 0.91922 1926.31 2.34262 330 691546.89
2000 274 0.91241 1944.61 2.36861 250 532824.29
2001 223 0.92377 1499.88 2.37668 206 334473.83
2002 140 0.95714 941.78 2.32143 134 131849.37
2003 163 0.96319 684.16 2.31902 157 111518.54
2004 195 0.9641 1281.29 2.48205 188 249851.3
2005 189 0.95767 1489.42 2.59259 181 281500.55
2006 184 0.94565 1428.89 2.38043 174 262914.96
2007 174 0.94253 1000.71 2.44828 164 174123.5
2008 102 0.83333 2134.72 2.68627 85 217741.26
2009 86 0.9186 2178.46 2.7907 79 187347.28
2010 110 0.93636 1470.64 2.61818 103 161770.04
2011 85 0.88235 2213.97 2.47059 75 188187.11
2012 125 0.968 943.84 2.584 121 117979.66
2013 112 0.96429 1105.45 2.50893 108 123810.93
2014 139 0.96403 1460.49 2.43885 134 203007.42
2015 56 0.92857 2434.31 2.55357 52 136321.49
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Panel B.
Connected advisors
Num of 
Observations
Mean
Completion
Rate
Mean Deal 
Value (in 
$ millions)
Mean Num 
of
Advisors
1990-1995 No 379 0.94 289.79 2.14
Yes 485 0.90 654.87 2.45
1996-2000 No 643 0.95 270.37 2.13
Yes 1077 0.91 2037.12 2.43
2001-2005 No 329 0.96 246.19 2.21
Yes 581 0.95 1708.64 2.54
2006-2010 No 205 0.96 331.99 2.26
Yes 451 0.90 2249.59 2.73
2011-2015 No 182 0.95 477.78 2.15
Yes 335 0.93 2224.20 2.70
Panel C.
Acquirer_sic2 Num 
of Obs
Percentage of 
Connected 
advisors
Percentage of 
Completed deals
Average Deal 
Value (in 
$ millions)
Average Num 
of advisors
Mining,
construction 239 62.16842857 91.26985714 1142.071429
2.48132143
Manufacturing
(soft) 587 63.8737 96.6589 2150.359
2.585022
Manufacturing
(hard) 993 60.0366 93.7362 680.854
2.255804
Utilities 490 65.73444444 87.991 1226.324444
2.41556111
Wholesale and 
retail 281 62.1798 92.5006 984.556
2.439725
Insurance, real 
estate 1282 67.29571429 94.30257143 967.9971429
2.40278
Hospitality 611 52.63085714 93.79657143 927.7471429 2.36810429
Health, legal,
education 178 40.96925 90.3975 406.45 2.2887425
Mining,
construction 217 61.66157143 89.47971429 998.7028571 2.4486
Manufacturing
(soft) 519 63.4181 96.0263 3859.799 2.88681
Manufacturing
(hard) 891 63.4157 93.4954 955.18 2.30854
Utilities 486 76.832625 88.02 1487.52 2.4935
Wholesale and
retail 301 64.1416 89.0076 805.961 2.360506
Insurance, real
estate 1265 67.79428571 94.18714286 981.1542857 2.389528571
Hospitality 724 62.007 94.52542857 921.27 2.550367143
Health, legal,
education 248 49.6045 93.69875 518.5475 2.1897525
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Panel B breaks the sample down by advisor connection. There are always more deals with connected 
advisors than the ones without in any given time. The deal completion rate is typically higher with 
unconnected advisors. On the other hand, the deals are significantly larger when connected advisors are 
hired. Deal size is often a proxy for deal complexity. As deals get bigger, it becomes harder to complete, 
so the completion rate is likely to drop. Therefore, without further controlling for deal characteristics, it is 
hard to determine whether the interbank connection is an advantage or disadvantage for the M&A 
transactions. Panel C breaks the sample down by industry, which is categorized using 2-digit SIC code. 
The two industries that are most active in M&A are Manufacturing firms and Financial firms. They also 
have the highest deal completion rate, which indicates these two industries are fairly mature for M&A 
transactions.
Table 2 Panel A reports the deal characteristics in terms of deal value. The sample is divided into two 
groups, one for the connected advisors, and the other one for the unconnected ones. The connected 
advisor deals receive significantly higher valuation than the unconnected counterparts. It appears that 
targets receive a lot more premiums when the financial advisors are connected than when they are not. 
For instance, the Deal Value/Net Income ratio for the connected advisor deal is almost tripled than that of 
the unconnected advisors. The results suggest targets benefit from the interbank connections significantly.
TABLE 2
DEAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS
Panel A.
Connected advisors No Yes Yes -No
Num of Obs 1738 2929
Deal Value/Sales 14.96 14.3253 -0.6347
Deal Value/EBIT 50.92 114.054 63.134***
Deal Value/EBITDA 19.7431 31.0454 11.3023***
Deal Value/Net
Income 67.813 200.792 132.979***
Panel B.
Connected advisors No Yes Yes -No
Num of Obs 1738 2929
(1,30) 0.17% -0.64% -0.008***
(-1,1) 0.76% 0.44% -0.003*
Acquirer CARs (-5,5) 1.29% 0.81% -0.005**
(-20,-1) 1.77% 1.36% -0.004**
(-20,5) 2.28% 1.73% -0.005*
For Public Targets Num of Obs 657 1193
(1,30) -0.15% -0.44% -0.003
Acquirer CARs (-1,1)(-5,5)
-0.54%
-0.22%
-1.25% -0.007* 
-0.83% -0.006
(-20,-1) 1.37% 1.34% -0.0002
(-20,5) 0.80% 0.07% -0.007
Target CARs (-1,1)(-5,5)
19.37%
21.28%
20.18% 0.008 
23.09% 0.0181*
(-20,-1) 8.11% 6.88% -0.012
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Panel B of Table 2 reports the announcement returns for both acquirers and targets if they are also 
public. It appears acquirers perform significantly worse both before and after the merger announcement, 
while targets’ stock performances are either indifferent between the two groups or are significantly better 
for the connected advisors deals. The result goes well with the previous findings about deal value. Targets 
are significantly better off with connected advisors, while acquirers are likely to be taken advantage of by 
the relationship.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
To further isolate the impact of interbank connections among M&A deals, we decide to pursue multi­
variate analysis. We start the analysis by examining if the presence of connected advisors is related to 
firm, deal, and/or advisor characteristics. If companies select financial advisors randomly, we should not 
see a trend. This analysis hopes to add to the existing literature on choice of financial advisor in M&A. In 
addition, it can be used to identify the factors that can affect both decision of having connected advisors 
as well as deal outcomes. Larger deal is more likely to be associated with connected advisors (Table 3). In 
addition, as the number of financial advisors increases in a deal, the advisors are more likely to be 
connected. Moreover, more reputable advisor is more likely to be associated with connected advisor deal. 
The result suggests connection is somewhat correlated with reputation. More reputable banks tend to be 
the ones with great connections since the connections help them gain more businesses, which in turns 
increase their market share. Because the purpose of the study is to document the benefits of interbank 
connections instead of the benefits of bank reputation, and there appears to be a correlation between the 
two variables, it is essential to include both variables in all the regressions. Having both variables as 
independent variables, we are able to identify the additional impacts of interbank connections, which has 
been studied previously. The choice of hiring connected advisors is not affected by payment method or 
deal type. Also, having a public target decreases the likelihood of using connected advisors, although it is 
not significant. Public targets are more transparent in general compared to their private counterparts, so it 
is relatively easy to obtain firm level information. The benefits of interbank connections will be small 
when the information asymmetry is insignificant. Therefore, there is no need to hire connected advisors 
when the targets are public.
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TABLE 3
CHOICE OF CONNECTED ADVISORS
Specification Specification
Variable 1 2
Intercept -0.522*** -0.466***
(<0.0001) (0.0009)
dealvalue 0.201*** 0.205***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001)
numadvisors 0.469*** 0.466***
(<0.0001) (0.0001)
deal advisor tier -0.708*** -0.700***
(<0.0001) (0.0001)
same_industry -0.053 -0.045
(0.2352) (0.3212)
target_public -0.047
(0.3073)
stock_pay -0.092
(0.1656)
whiteknight 0.157
(0.7498)
tender 0.066
-0.3754
adj-R2 0.29 0.29
N 4667 4667
Next, we are interested to see if connected advisors affect deal completion rate after controlling for 
deal characteristics. The results indicate the interbank connection has no significant impact on the 
completion rate (Table 4). After controlling for firm, deal, and advisor characteristics, deals with 
connected advisors are indifferent from the ones without in terms of deal success rate. The factors that 
have significant impacts on the completion rate are deal size and target status. It appears as the deal gets 
larger and/or target is public, the deal is less likely to be completed regardless the use of connected 
advisors or not.
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TABLE 4
IMPACT ON DEAL COMPLETION RATE
Variable
Intercept
Specification
1
2.576*** 
(<0.0001)
Specification
2
2.575***
(0.0001)
Specification
3
2.298***
(0.0001)
Specification
4
2.294*** 
(<0.0001)
connected_advisors -0.122 -0.120 0.240 0.248
(0.1068) (0.1125) (0.5353) (0.5198)
deal_value -0 119*** -0 119*** -0.075* -0.073*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0799) (0.0869)
connected*deal_value -0.060 -0.063
(0.2216) (0.1941)
num_advisors 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.023
(0.7113) (0.7033) (0.5876) (0.5765)
deal_advisor_tier -0.053 -0.056 -0.035 -0.040
(0.2679) (0.2466) (0.6604) (0.607)
connected*deal_advis -0.021 -0.014
(0.8346) (0.8827)
same_industry -0.034 -0.037 -0.031 -0.034
(0.5872) (0.5502) (0.6197) (0.5859)
target_public -0.4194*** -0.416*** -0.416*** -0.412***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
tender -0.095 -0.096 -0.099 -0.100
(0.2991) (0.2947) (0.2807) (0.2745)
white_knight -0.089 -0.091 -0.097 -0.099
(0.8371) (0.8333) (0.8221) (0.8191)
adj-R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
N 4646 4646 4667 4667
Since interbank connections have no significant impact on deal completion rate, why are they still 
present systematically in some cases? To explore this question, we decide to look at the impact of 
interbank connection on completion speed. It turns out interbank connection significantly reduces the 
number of days it takes to complete an M&A deal (Table 5). On average, the deals with connected 
advisors take 34 days less to complete than the one without, and the difference is significant at 5% level. 
The result supports the idea that interbank connection facilitates information flow between the acquirer 
and target during an M&A transaction. Financial advisors can operate more efficiently with the 
relationship than without. Controlling for connection, as deal size increases, the days to completion also 
increases. This again supports the argument that as deals become more complicated, it takes more time to 
process the information. In addition, more reputable banks tend to take significantly longer time to 
complete the deal. The same is true for public targets. Both are statistically significant at 1% level.
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TABLE 5
IMPACT ON DEAL COMPLETION SPEED
Specification Specification
Variable 1 2
Intercept 27.668***
(0.0011)
56.319***
(0.0001)
connected_advisors 5.178
(0.1429)
-34.036**
(0.0491)
deal_value
connected*deal_value
3.262***
(0.0033)
-2.964
(0.1228)
9.152***
(<.0001)
num_advisors 13.615***
(<0.0001)
12.749***
(0.0001)
deal_advisor_tier
connected*deal_advis
11.387*** 
(<0.0001)
12.716***
(0.0002)
-4.323
(0.3367)
same_industry 18.661***
(0.0001)
18.135***
(0.0001)
target_public 32.949***
(0.0001)
31.769***
(0.0001)
tender -35.596***
(0.0001)
-34.257***
(0.0001)
white_knight 30.898
(0.2808)
27.965
(0.3280)
adj-R2 0.18 0.18
N 4646 4667
Finally, we are interested to see if deal quality is influenced by the interbank connection. We use 
announcement returns as an indirect way to measure deal quality. A positive announcement returns 
signals superior quality, while a negative announcement returns indicate the deal quality is in doubt. It 
turns out the interbank connection has no significant impact on acquirer’s announcement returns, but it 
has a significant positive impact on target’s returns (Table 6). Target’s 11-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) that starts 5 days prior to the announcement and 5 days post announcement are higher 
when the financial advisors are connected than when they are not. It appears the quality of the deal is 
mostly unaffected by the connections. Connected advisors don’t exploit the interbank connections and 
sacrifice deal quality for deal completion. However, there appears to be a wealth transfer between targets 
and acquirers. Targets are better off with connected advisors, indicated by their positive announcement 
stock returns, so it is to their advantage to hire financial advisors that are connected with the ones hired by 
the acquirers.
Journal of Accounting and Finance Vol. 17(8) 2017 51
TABLE 6
IMPACT ON ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS
Variable Acquirer's CARs Target's CARs
(-1,1) (-5,5) (-20,5) (-1,1) (-5,5) (-20,5)
Intercept 0.038** 0.053** 0.078*** 0.205*** 0.254*** 0.333***
(0.0354) (0.0179) (0.0082) (0.0058) (0.0013) (0.0001)
connected_advisors 0.028 0.017 -0.010 0.112 0.153* 0.143
(0.1817) (0.5003) (0.7692) (0.1919) (0.0921) (0.1494)
deal_value -0.005** -0.007** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0083) (0.8687) (0.7294) (0.6841)
connected*deal_value -0.007** -0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.018* -0.018
(0.0105) (0.2121) (0.8901) (0.1238) (0.0926) (0.1207)
num_advisors 0.008 0.010 0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.1565) (0.1780) (0.5642) (0.8022) (0.7379) (0.7966)
connected*num_advisor 0.005 0.002 0.006 -0.006 -0.000 -0.009
(0.4504) (0.7753) (0.5594) (0.8193) (0.9908) (0.7740)
deal_advisor_tier -0.007* -0.009* -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.019
(0.0568) (0.0503) (0.2865) (0.8707) (0.8135) (0.2663)
connected*deal_advisor -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.009 -0.006 -0.002
target_public
(0.6509)
0.021*** 
(<0.0001)
(0.7018)
0.022*** 
(<0.0001)
(0.5582)
-0.023*** 
(<0.0001)
(0.6573) (0.7675) (0.9366)
adj-R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11
N 4667 4667 4667 1850 1850 1850
CONCLUSION
Connected advisors in general, should have information advantages over unconnected advisors. The 
trust they have built via prior connections facilitate the exchange of information between the acquirer and 
the target. Hence, they are able to handle complex deals more efficiently. Deals that have significant 
information asymmetry, which requires smooth information flow, are more likely to use connected 
advisors. We find larger and more complex deals are more frequently associated with connected advisors. 
In addition, connected advisors can process the information better and handle the negotiation faster 
because of the knowledge about each other. As a result, they can complete the deals quicker even when 
the deals are more complicated. After controlling for deal complexity, we find interbank connection 
significantly reduces the amount of time it takes to complete a deal. However, we fail to find any 
evidence on the impact of interbank connections on deal completion rate. It appears the impact is 
insignificant. Moreover, interbank connections can bring in immediate financial benefits for the targets, 
indicated by its positive stock returns surrounding the M&A announcement.
In sum, it appears that hiring connected advisors are beneficial to both acquirers and targets. Although 
the benefits are more important to the target firms than they are to the acquiring firms. Therefore, firms 
should take into consideration the interbank connection when making their advisor choices, especially 
when the deal is large and complex and has strong information asymmetry. The interbank connection can
52 Journal of Accounting and Finance Vol. 17(8) 2017
facilitate the transaction. It can reduce the times needed to complete the transaction, which is important 
for both parties. The longer they wait, the lower the returns will be. Also, as time passes, the number of 
uncertainties also increases, which is likely to reduce or destroy the potential synergies that are resulted 
from the M&A deal. All these terrible outcomes can be potentially prevented if firms use connected 
financial advisors. Since connections are useful for merger and acquisitions, banks should work on 
building their networks. They should emphasize more on establishing connections with various financial 
institutions to ultimately increase their chances of being selected as financial advisors in future deals.
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